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AN OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSED MILITARY POLICY.

U. S. WAR DEPARTMENT, *Disc.*
Washington, November 1, 1915.

In proposing a military policy to be adopted at this time, the very first thing to do must be to agree upon the proper basis.

The subject could, theoretically, be approached without regard to existing constitutional and legal provisions and existing institutions and sentiments. Undoubtedly this method would result in proposals that would be sound from a military point of view and would theoretically approach perfection. The necessity of making such a system practicable, however, would require constitutional amendments, a reversal of existing institutions, and the changing of existing sentiments to such an extent as to make it a safe prediction that little, if anything, would be accomplished, and that only after the passage of a great length of time.

The other possible method of approaching the subject is one which recognizes existing constitutional and legal provisions, existing institutions, and the sentiments of the people in so far as they concern vital portions of the system.

As between the two methods of approach, it seems so clearly the part of wisdom to choose the one last stated as not to require elaboration of reason.

The essential, the imperative thing, is to make such wise military preparations and take such wise precautions as are presently possible. These reasons dispose of many suggestions which are entirely worthy of consideration from a military standpoint, but which could not be made effective under existing conditions. Military systems based upon universal military service, upon conscription, or upon national control of the public-school system, fall under this head, as also does any policy which can only be made operative by a constitutional amendment or by identical, contemporaneous legislation in the 48 States of the Union. In any policy proposed, moreover, the matter of the cost of its maintenance has much to do with its acceptability, not that there should be any legitimate objection to the necessary expense of a proper policy, but that there would be legitimate objection to the adoption of any policy which was unnecessarily expensive.

The policy proposed, therefore, proceeds upon the basis of existing conditions of a legal and constitutional nature and recognizes existing institutions and the feeling of the people concerning the general subject matter.

The Constitution provides that Congress may raise and support armies, and under that provision the regular standing army exists. It likewise provides that organized militia may be maintained in the different States; that the National Government may provide arms for this force, may decide upon the nature and character of its organization, and may prescribe the discipline to which it must conform. It reserves to the respective States the right to govern this force, to appoint the officers thereof, and to train it.

In time of peace this force is available to the President of the United States, under the Constitution, to aid in enforcing the laws of the Union, to aid in suppressing insurrections, and in repelling invasions. There is no constitutional provision which makes this

force otherwise available to the Nation in time of war, and therefore no law can be passed by Congress making it so available. In order to obtain whatever is possible to be obtained in this respect, the act of Congress concerning the raising of volunteers provides that such organized regiments of the National Guard as volunteer may be taken over into the service of the United States intact and not merely as individuals.

It will be seen, therefore, that under the Constitution there is contemplated two kinds of military forces—one a national force raised and maintained directly by the acts of the National Congress, and the other a force raised entirely by the States, to be governed, officered, and trained by them and to be available to the national authorities in certain specified instances.

If the determination arrived at by those whose knowledge, skill, and experience makes their judgment practically conclusive is accepted, we should have in this country a force of at least 500,000 men ready for instant response to a call in the event of war or the imminence of war. It is surely not necessary to state the many reasons why this force may not be supplied by a regular standing army of that number constantly under arms. For reasons which have just been pointed out it is equally impracticable to suggest that this force should consist solely of the National Guard expanded to that number. There is no legal way that the National Guard can, in time of peace, be governed, officered, or trained by the National Government; and there is no legal way, excepting by volunteering, that it can be made available to the Nation in time of war to any greater extent than specified in the Constitution, which confessedly falls short of the necessary uses to which an army may have to be put in the event of a war with a foreign nation.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to devise some method of making available for the use of the Nation in time of war a national force in supplement of that part of the national force, to wit, the Regular Army, which is constantly under arms; a part of the Army, in other words, to be raised and maintained by Congress and governed in all respects in accordance with its directions. When this system is devised and made operative the Nation would militarily be in this situation: It would have, as the Constitution provides, an Army raised and maintained by it, composed of a certain number constantly under arms, and a very much larger number definitely identified in personnel, provided with equipment and organization, possessed of some training, and subject to instant call. The States would have the Organized Militia, developed with Federal assistance to the highest practicable point of efficiency, available for the purposes specified in the Constitution, and so circumstanced that in the event of a war with a foreign nation they could, by their own volition, immediately take their place with the other military force of the Nation.

Having reached these conclusions, we approach the question of their practical application.

Our military responsibilities include not only continental United States but also the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the Panama Canal. On the military side, as distinguished from the naval side, there is necessity for provision not only for mobile army troops—that is, Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery—but for coast fortifications and troops to man them.

At the present time appropriations are available for the maintenance of an army and all of the accessory employees thereof aggregating 5,023 officers and 102,985 enlisted men. Of these 67,000 men are mobile army troops, 20,000 are coast defense troops, and the balance are Hospital Corps, quartermaster men, and other employees of that character. Of this total number, about 29,000 are on service outside continental United States, leaving therein about 46,000 mobile army troops and about 13,000 coast defense troops. Deductions must be made from these latter figures of sufficient troops to garrison the over-sea possessions, which will materially reduce each of the totals above mentioned.

The Organized Militia in the various States has an enrollment of approximately 129,000 men and officers.

The policy as proposed provides for the over-sea garrisons in accordance with the approved plan of 1913, and for the presence in continental United States of approximately 50,000 mobile army troops and 20,000 Coast Artillery troops, together with the necessary auxiliary troops, etc.

The total of the enlisted men and officers in the Regular Army, when the plan has been completely carried out, would be 141,843.

It is proposed that the term of enlistment in the Regular Army shall be two years with the colors and four years on furlough, during which latter period the obligation would be to return to the colors in the event of war or the imminence thereof. Under this scheme there would always be in the country a large number of men who had been trained in the Regular Army and who, during the period mentioned, would be subject to the call of the Nation to be placed in the Regular Army or to be held in reserve to supply wastage or to be utilized in whatever way was thought best.

The plan necessitates the raising of the following additional organizations and proposes to do this in two fiscal years, one-half in the next fiscal year and the other in the succeeding one:

- 10 regiments of Infantry,
- 4 regiments of Field Artillery,
- 52 companies of Coast Artillery,
- 15 companies of Engineers,
- 4 aero squadrons.

It is not now proposed to attempt a rearrangement of army posts. However undersirable from a military standpoint the location of some existing posts may be, they do exist and can be utilized, and in fact will all be necessary if the increased force is provided. The essential thing at this time is to obtain the requisite men and materiel, and it is relatively unessential where we house them. It seems the part of wisdom, therefore, not now to ask for money to acquire, erect, and equip new places when the existing ones can be used, and furthermore will be available in great degree, for the training of the supplement of the standing army, which is a part of the plan.

It is proposed to supplement the Army that is constantly under arms by a force of 400,000 men raised in increments of 133,000 a year, obligated to devote a specified time to training for a period of three years, and then to be on furlough for a period of three years without obligation excepting to return to the colors in the event of war or the imminence thereof. For the purpose of convenience this force has been designated the continental army. It is proposed to recruit it territorially according to population; to have it subjected to short

periods of intensive training; and in addition to what officers may be developed from its own operations, to obtain officers for it from those who have served in the National Guard, those who have served in the United States Army and are no longer upon its active list, and those who, by training acquired in colleges and schools or in other ways, have become equipped with sufficient military information and experience to make them available. It is the purpose to have the membership of this force assembled at convenient places and have there such portions of the Regular Army to assist in their training as are desirable, and to obtain all the benefit which can be obtained from intensive training over such a period of time as is possible. For the purposes of the necessary figuring upon costs, etc., as well as for military reasons, the period proposed is two months. It is recognized, however, that with respect to this period of training and other features of the plan a final wise determination can only be reached after the fullest interchange of views between those who collectively represent the wisdom, experience, and knowledge to determine these matters properly.

With respect to the National Guard, it is proposed not only to continue the existing assistance rendered by the Federal Government, but to increase it. In the references previously made to the National Guard the relationship of that body to the military system of the country was stated. With the existing cooperation of the Federal Government and the earnest efforts of the membership of the guard great progress has been made in the last decade and, in the judgment of all those concerned, still greater progress is not only possible but assured. There is the fullest recognition and appreciation of the untiring devotion and patriotic spirit of those who have unceasingly wrought for the improvement of this body. This body has, as above stated, a clearly defined and important part in the military system of the country, and it is proposed in the plan advocated to amplify the Federal assistance in every way that it can be done constitutionally, so as to aid this force and make it efficient for the purposes set forth in the Constitution, and for the further purpose for which it is available in the event of war if it volunteers for Federal service. The plan offers to the membership of the National Guard every alternative which a full recognition of their position suggests. With respect to the National Guard system under the Constitution there is to be not only continued but increased Federal cooperation and assistance. With respect to the personnel of the guard opportunity is offered, either in units or individually, to come into the Continental Army whenever by the action of their State they are free to do so.

From this outline of the policy it will be observed that it has been framed in view of existing legal and other conditions. It provides for a standing army of a minimum size to perform the necessary functions of such a force, including the very important one of training the other military forces. It provides a supplement to that army into which the citizens of the country who realize the necessity of patriotic action on their part can go with a minimum sacrifice. It continues available for all its legal purposes the other force outside of the National Army, and provides for increasing cooperation therewith. It offers opportunity to the three great classes of the community that are considered available for military purposes in so far as training and preparation in time of peace are concerned, namely, those who will undertake

regular service, being constantly under arms; those who desire to prepare themselves but can not take such preparation in intensive periods; and those who are so circumstanced that the intensive training best meets their conditions.

Both with respect to the army that is constantly under arms and the continental army, its supplement, there is no request for sums of money to build or provide accommodations therefor. The policy seems to come as nearly as is possible to meeting the conditions which must be met in a country which does not provide for universal military service or for compulsory military service, and does offer an opportunity to solve the military problem along the line of the patriotic spirit and conduct of its citizenship.

The framers of the policy are fully conscious of the possibility of formulating military policies much better in theory, but after concentrated consideration of existing legal and other conditions they think it will be found that almost insuperable objections and difficulties arise in carrying into practical operation suggestions that from the military standpoint might otherwise be very acceptable.

This completes consideration in so far as the personnel of the proposed policy is concerned, and leaves for consideration the questions of reserve materiel, coast defenses, and other subjects not properly part of a formulated policy with respect to prepared forces.

For the purpose of ascertaining the requirements with respect to the coast-defense fortifications, the Secretary of War some months ago created a board composed of the heads of all departments having to do with this subject matter. Space and other considerations make it undesirable to go into the matter as reported upon by them, in detail; it is sufficient to say that they have given the entire subject full consideration, aided by reports and suggestions of those on the ground and familiar therewith. Under their instructions they were to report upon any needed fortifications at places where they do not now exist, any change at existing fortifications, and any supplements thereto. They have prepared elaborate reports covering all these points and have suggested a total expenditure during the next four years of \$80,000,000 in annual increments of \$20,000,000 each.

In similar manner the heads of the various departments which have to do with equipment and supplies have studied the situation with a view to ascertaining what matériel should be on hand for use by a force of 500,000 men in addition to what would be in their hands at the outbreak of hostilities. The result of this study was an aggregate of approximately \$104,000,000, to be accumulated throughout the period of four years by the expenditure annually of \$26,000,000.

Many other subjects have been studied and provision made with respect to them which can not usefully be dwelt upon in this statement. With respect to such important subjects as aviation, its equipment and personnel, the necessity for large guns which may be moved from place to place, field guns and machine guns in sufficient quantities, coast-defense guns of proper size, proper reserves of ammunition for all arms, and motor transportation careful study has been devoted to the consideration thereof, and the recommendations to be made are the results of the best thought and experience with respect thereto.

It has been proposed to make available in time of need the services of those in certain kinds of employment requiring special knowledge

and skill, such as railroad men, bridge builders, engineers of all descriptions, etc., and leading men in these lines and professions have been collaborating with the War Department in an endeavor to formulate, by legislation or administrative action, an acceptable and useful plan with respect thereto. In this connection, and because of the patriotic spirit thus displayed, it seems desirable to say that if those who are the employers of the young men of the country can not, by reason of age or situation in life, give their personal service, they can do that which will be equally useful, by encouraging in every way the participation of those in their employ in the plan of national defense. If they would so arrange their business that a certain proportion of those whom they engage could undertake this national service without sacrificing their personal interests, those who did this thing would be acting in the most public-spirited and patriotic manner possible.

What follows with respect to the details of numbers, organizations, and cost completes this outline of the proposed policy.

Under this plan there would be stationed the following totals of officers and enlisted men at the following places:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Panama Canal Zone.....	272	9,490
Hawaiian Islands.....	503	16,869
Philippine Islands.....	448	14,324
Do.....	182	5,733
Porto Rico.....	32	599
Alaska.....	16	44
Total over-sea garrisons.....	1,453	47,456

¹ Philippine Scouts.

In continental United States there would be the following organizations aggregating the following totals of officers and enlisted men:

	Officers.	Enlisted men.
11½ regiments of Cavalry.....	597	11,973
26½ regiments of Infantry.....	1,361	23,512
7 regiments of Field Artillery.....	308	6,599
170 companies of Coast Artillery.....	510	18,968
Engineer troops.....	104	3,262
Signal troops.....	76	654
Total at home, combatant forces.....	2,956	66,968
Mobile army, deducting Coast Artillery.....	2,446	48,000

In addition to the above, there are at home and abroad 1,927 officers of the staff departments and extra officers provided by law, and 50 veterinarians. The plan calls for 750 more officers for the proper execution of this plan, involving, as it must, the training of the citizen soldiers, and more cooperation with the National Guard and with those educational institutions which have military courses.

In addition to the enumerated forces in the Regular Army, there must be provided a total of 20,283 men for the Quartermaster Corps, Hospital Corps, Ordnance Department, recruiting service, school detachments, etc., including 792 additional noncommissioned officers to aid in training the citizen soldiers.

Thus, the total of the officers and enlisted men in the Regular Army, as proposed above, at home and abroad, will be:

material of the kind which can not be obtained with reasonable promptness, as follows:

Quartermaster material-----	\$19, 474, 390. 97
Ordnance material -----	74, 582, 237. 85
Medical supplies -----	716, 423. 81
Signal material-----	7, 530, 928. 45
Engineer material -----	2, 022, 280. 00
Total-----	104, 326, 261. 08

It is deemed best to provide for this accumulation in four annual increments at the annual rate of \$26,081,320.

SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS.

The board before mentioned reported an irreducible minimum for additional seacoast defenses, necessary accessories, and an adequate reserve of ammunition, totaling \$81,677,000, of which there would be used:

In continental United States-----	\$60, 540, 000
Over seas -----	21, 137, 000

This board estimates that appropriations can be expended to the greatest advantage at an annual rate of approximately \$20,000,000, thus completing the work in four years.

If these requirements are met, the results would be as follows, so far as cost is concerned:

For the first year:

For the personnel, etc., of the Regular Army, National Guard, and Citizen Army-----	\$136, 635, 716. 08
For reserve material-----	26, 081, 320. 00
For seacoast defenses-----	20, 000, 000. 00
Total-----	182, 717, 036. 08

For the second year:

For the Regular Army-----	127, 234, 559. 70
National Guard-----	10, 000, 000. 00
Citizen Army-----	29, 500, 000. 00
Reserve material-----	26, 081, 320. 00
Seacoast defenses-----	20, 000, 000. 00
Total-----	212, 815, 879. 70

For the third and fourth year:

Regular Army-----	127, 234, 559. 70
National Guard-----	10, 000, 000. 00
Citizen army-----	45, 000, 000. 00
Reserve material-----	26, 081, 320. 00
Seacoast defenses-----	20, 000, 000. 00
Total-----	228, 315, 879. 70

Annually thereafter:

Regular Army-----	127, 234, 559. 70
National Guard-----	10, 000, 000. 00
Citizen army-----	45, 000, 000. 00
Total-----	182, 234, 559. 70

LINDLEY M. GARRISON,
Secretary of War.

Officers.....	7, 086
Veterinarians.....	50
Enlisted men.....	134, 707

To obtain this result, the plan calls for the following new organizations:

10 regiments of Infantry.
 4 regiments of Field Artillery.
 52 companies of Coast Artillery.
 15 companies of Engineers.
 4 aero squadrons.

Using reserve matériel as far as available to equip new organizations, the estimated cost of the Regular Army on the proposed plan of 7,086 officers, 50 veterinarians, and 134,707 enlisted men will be \$127,234,559.70. It is proposed, however, to provide for the additional organizations in two annual equal increments, so that the first year the cost of the proposed Army would be \$111,035,716.08. To this must be added for the first year's cost the cost of cantonments at over-sea garrisons, amounting to \$600,000, making the total for the first year \$111,635,716.08.

At the present time the Federal Government appropriates for or on behalf of the National Guard an average of \$6,614,532.13 annually. The States individually appropriate for their respective guard an aggregate of \$6,244,214.98 annually. It is proposed this year to increase the Federal appropriation to \$10,000,000.

Using reserve matériel to the extent available for the personal accoutrement of the citizen soldiers and not furnishing them with full complement of wagon transportation, horses for cavalry, etc., it is estimated that the cost of the first year, when 133,000 men are to be trained, will be approximately \$15,000,000; the second year, when an additional 133,000 are to be trained, the cost will be approximately \$29,500,000; and the third year, when the whole 400,000 will be under training, the cost will be approximately \$45,000,000, and this will be the annual cost of the system when in complete operation.

The first year the estimated items of cost would be as follows:

For the Regular Army.....	\$111, 635, 716. 08
For the citizen army.....	15, 000, 000. 00
For the National Guard.....	10, 000, 000. 00

Total 136, 635, 716. 08

When the system is in complete operation, without considering reserves of the different organizations, the results as to numbers and cost would be as follows:

	Officers and enlisted men.	Total cost.
Regular Army.....	141, 843	\$127, 234, 559. 70
National Guard.....	129, 000	10, 000, 000. 00
Citizen army.....	400, 000	45, 000, 000. 00
Total.....	670, 843	182, 234, 559. 70

With respect to reserve material:

In addition to material in the hands of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the citizen army, already provided for in previously stated estimates, there should be provided and kept in reserve

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